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Before the civil war in El Salvador, almost everyone in Tierra Blanca worked on the Hacienda California, a giant farm stretching from the edge of town across the fertile coastal plain to the Bay of Jiquilisco ten kilometers to the south. From their small houses in town or their shacks along the railway and roadways, every morning the workers walked past the hacienda's security post, past the gun ports of the fortified bunker, and through the gated entrance. They continued past the hacienda compound and the soldiers' quarters, past the barracks that housed the migrant workers during the harvest, and on toward the vast cotton fields, pastures, and salt flats beyond.
Before the war, the children of this town in southwestern Usulután had little reason to doubt that when they grew up, they would join their parents tending cotton and cattle and processing salt on the Palomo family's vast and well-guarded estate.
But in the mid and late 1970s, some residents of Tierra Blanca joined in local protests and strikes, a few marched in the capital San Salvador, and a very few collaborated with guerrilla organizations that would become the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Unrest and violence deepened after 1976 when a coalition of landlords and military hardliners brutally derailed a reformist government's attempt at a limited agrarian reform along the coastal plain. In 1979, workers struck for higher wages on the Hacienda California, their last attempt to better working conditions through what in many other countries iii would be considered normal forms of worker collective action. National Guard troops billeted on the farm responded with growing brutality. As the country lurched toward civil war at the end of the 1970s, brutalized corpses of activists, relatives of activists, and suspected activists appeared overnight where the coastal highway meets the roads going north to the towns of San Francisco Javier and San Agustín. Many residents fled the area for the relative safety of the provincial capital, San Salvador, and the United States. In 1980, the besieged government expropriated several farms in the area as part of an agrarian reform intended to quell the insurgency. Like many large holdings, the Hacienda California was not included as the Palomo family had pre-emptively subdivided the legal ownership of the property into nine parcels owned by different family members (although it was worked as a single enterprise). But as violence deepened in the area, the Palomo family no longer visited or actively worked the farm. "It was bad luck for the Palomo family," one elderly resident of Tierra Blanca (1992) told me, "in 1979, the people rose up against all this injustice --the origins of the war lie in the holding of land in the hands of a few."
For the next decade, both the FMLN and government troops maintained a presence in the region, the FMLN in small encampments in the rough terrain both north and south of Tierra Blanca and the government in bases in Tierra Blanca and the nearby towns of Jiquilisco and San Marcos Lempa. Minor fire fights were frequent; occasionally, one side or the other would mount a major offensive beyond their bases, leading to renewed flight from neighboring hamlets to Tierra Blanca and the town of Jiquilisco.
In 1983 residents began to cultivate the Hacienda California and neighboring properties, planting corn and some beans to sustain their families. At first they did so surreptitiously. After government control of Tierra Blanca was stabilized in the following years, representatives of the Palomo family were intermittently present in the area and residents paid rent for use of the land. In 1987, a few dozen tenants formed a cooperative to strengthen their tenancy; they continued to pay rent to the Palomos. In 1990, militant activists were elected to lead the cooperative. According to a cooperative member, "we felt that it was unjust: many people had died yet the Palomos still received their rent and so few people still controlled the land. So we made some new rules" (Tierra Blanca, 1992). The new leadership affiliated the cooperative with a national organization with close ties to the FMLN. iv On May 5, 1991, cooperative members took over the hacienda, claiming it as the property of their organization, the Cooperativa California. The Palomo family responded by leasing it to a powerful commercial farmer, Francisco Guirola, but when he attempted to enter the property, cooperative members blocked the entrance. He returned two days later accompanied by the National Guard but cooperative members again blocked the entrance as journalists called in by the national organization documented the confrontation. Emboldened by their success, a few months later the cooperative took over the Palomos' lucrative salt flats along the coast. In defense of these and other occupations in the area, members of the Cooperative California and neighboring cooperatives blocked the coastal highway in September, 1991, actions made less risky by the presence of journalists and observers from the United Nations who had been alerted by federation leaders (see photographs in Chapter 6).
After representatives of the Salvadoran government and the FMLN signed an interim agreement on September 25, 1991 in Mexico City sketching the terms of the final peace agreement that would end the civil war, members of the Cooperativa California began fencing the boundaries of the estate in a renewed and explicit expression of the de facto transfer of property rights. In anticipation of the settlement, both parties to the civil war attempted to preemptively settle supporters as claimants to the rich coastal area. On January 28, 1992 -twelve days after the signing of the peace agreement and a few days before the beginning of the formal cease-fire that would confine government forces to their barracksthe National Guard and the army's Sixth Brigade evicted those attempting to occupy the nearby Hacienda Concordia, another property leased by Guirola. The eviction sent two people to the hospital in San Salvador as a result of what United Nations observers judged excessive force. On January 30 th , the president and vice president of the Cooperativa California were also arrested. In response to the detentions, guerrilla commanders of the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (Revolutionary Army of the People, ERP) suspended the movement of their forces to the designated cease-fire areas, an action that briefly endangered the peace process, until the activists were released. Cooperative members eventually won title to a portion of the Hacienda California under the terms of the peace agreement.
The civil war thus transformed the political, economic and social landscape of the Jiquilisco coast. Rather than the large estates protected by state security forces that dominated the area before the civil war, in its aftermath new v organizations played powerful roles. Cooperatives controlled land, federations of cooperatives articulated their needs nationally as well as locally, and the FMLN --now an opposition political party in an unprecedently competitive political party system --sought to represent their interests politically. In 1997 and again in 2000, the FMLN candidate won the municipal election in Jiquilisco.
Some of these changes of the Jiquilisco landscape are captured in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, maps drawn for me by members of the Cooperativa La Normandía over the course of two days in 1992. Figure 1 .1 shows the Hacienda La Normandía, a very large property (1,500 hectares) similar to the Hacienda California that lies along its eastern border, extending from the coastal highway to the Bay of Jiquilisco. Before the war, the farm was owned by the Del'Pech family, a major coffee-producing family. Cotton was the principal crop, as indicated by the lollipop symbol. The cow figures along the lower edge, teasingly called cucarachas (cockroaches) by kibbitzing members of the cooperative, indicate the raising of cattle that grazed the salt marshes along the southern border. Toward the upper left hand corner of the map, the barracks of the National Guard (three or four members were always billeted on the farm) and the airstrip are indicated. The permanent workers lived in the cantón La Cruzadilla just above the map's center.
The farm was expropriated in 1980 as part of the agrarian reform and a cooperative of former employees was named by the military officer present. But the counterinsurgency intent of the reform was not realized: some members of the cooperative continued to covertly assist the FMLN and the cooperative later joined an opposition organization. As shown in Figure 1 .2, at the close of the war, the approximately 175 cooperative members cultivated individual plots of corn, sesame, and, near the old farmhouse, chile; many cooperative members raised a few head of cattle as well. Notably, the National Guard post was gone. (The pink grid of properties along the right hand edge of the map indicates property lost in 1989 as a result of a conflict with the government.) For cooperative members, this was a way of life far different from their lives before the war. Such profound changes were not limited to the Jiquilisco coast, as we shall see.
Insert Figures 1.1 and 1.2 here, full-sized on facing pages
The campesinos who recounted to me the taking of the Hacienda California, those who drew for me maps of the lands they occupied in Jiquilisco vi and elsewhere, and others like them throughout El Salvador redrew the boundaries of class and reshaped political culture as the civil war raged around them.
2 Few of them had ever engaged in politics of any kind. Just a decade earlier the idea that they would write a chapter in the history of their country would have seemed a cruel joke.
Insurgent Collective Action in El Salvador
The campesinos in Usulután and throughout El Salvador who participated in land occupations and marches and provided logistical support to the guerrillas took mortal risks in doing so; many paid the ultimate price. Just before and during much of the war, covert death squads and regular military forces carried out assassinations and disappearances with impunity throughout the contested areas. In interview after interview during and immediately after the civil war, my respondents described the loss of family members, friends, and fellow participants. One young woman, a resident of the hamlet of La Peña north of Jiquilisco, told me, Some armed themselves, others fled. We [those who stayed in the area] were all seen as guerrillas. Every time we went to the coast, we were searched at the intersection. 1982 was a year of desperation, almost everyone left. My brother disappeared in 1982, one of hundreds who disappeared in 1982 and 1983 --every day there were two or three bodies at the intersection. After all these years of war, the dead weigh heavily. (1992) While her count at the intersection is higher than other sources suggest, multiple sources document the large numbers of Salvadorans who died during the civil war. More than 75,000 civilians (in a country of five million people) were killed during the war, about one in 56 Salvadorans (1.8 percent), a figure comparable to that of the US during the American Civil War (1:55) and of Britain in World War I (1:57), and somewhat less than the figures for the Guatemalan and Nicaragua civil wars (both about 1:40). 3 The death rate of civilians in El Salvador was 28 times greater than that of civilians under the military regimes of Argentina and Chile where human rights activists were said to run high risks. 4 According to the Truth Commission (1993), the UN-sponsored vii organization authorized by the peace agreement to document human rights violations during the civil war, the vast majority (more than 85 percent) of the serious acts of violence analyzed by the commission were carried out by state agents or those acting under the direction of state agents against alleged supporters of opposition organizations. 5 In contrast to much of the violence in Argentina and Brazil, the violence often occurred in public or the results were displayed in public places. 6 Activists did not have to be guerrillas or to work with the guerrillas to run the risk of being "disappeared" or killed. The Truth Commission found that "any organization in a position to promote opposing ideas that questioned official policy was automatically labeled as working for the guerrillas. To belong to such an organization meant being branded a subversive" (Truth Commission 1993: 311). Campesinos were frequent victims of the violence: the human rights agency of the Archdiocese of San Salvador recorded 12,501 political murders in 1981; of the 6,718 whose profession was known, 76 percent were campesinos (Americas Watch 1982: 278-9).
The degree of risk of course varied from place to place and month to month. Violence against politically active or suspect campesinos was most extensive and arbitrary before and in the early years of the war (from about 1979 to 1983), after which it declined significantly (in part a response to the conditioning of U.S. assistance to the government on its human rights record). This decline is evident in Figure 1 .3 which traces maximum and minimum estimates of war-related deaths (both civilian and military, including disappearances) each year. Nonetheless, campesino activists were killed throughout the war; leaders of land occupations were particularly vulnerable. Whether or not many Salvadoran campesinos engaged in such grim reckoning, the risks of insurgent participation were evident in the patterns of widespread disappearances of purported activists and the subsequent reappearance of many of their tortured bodies.
Despite the high risk of insurgent activism, collaboration by many --but far from all --poor rural residents was an essential element of the FMLN's military and political capacity throughout the war, according to a wide range of analyses, including that of U.S. military officers. 7 What explains insurgent participation in this context of high risk? The relevant literatures on revolutions, collective action, and social movements provide some guidance but not adequate answers to the puzzle of high-risk collective action in the Salvadoran context. 8 Some analysts of revolutions and peasant rebellions suggest that class conflict forms the basis of revolutionary mobilization. Karl Marx, for example, argued that the shared experience of exploitation on the part of the industrial proletariat would lead to socialist mobilization and revolution. Marx of course was mistaken in his identification of the likely bearer of revolutions: poor rural working people played essential roles in most social revolutions while the industrial proletariat mobilized for revolution in only a few. Which particular type of poor rural resident played the preponderant role in various revolutions is much debated in the literature, whether it was the peasant strictly speaking, or landless rural workers, and so forth. In an analysis of agrarian revolutions, Jeffrey Paige (1975) analyzes what configurations of landlords and cultivators result in what kinds of rural protests. He concludes that peasants participate in revolution (as opposed to isolated agrarian revolts) where landlords largely depend on ix income from land and thus can make few concessions, and peasants depend on wages and are thus less dependent on landlords for access to land.
Paige's emphasis on the underlying conflict between cultivators and landlords and the latter's willingness to compromise or not certainly illuminates the Salvadoran case. The Salvadoran civil war was, at the macro-level, a struggle between classes. The longstanding oligarchic alliance of the economic elite and the military led to a highly unequal society in which the great majority of Salvadorans were excluded from all but the most meager life opportunities. The response of this oligarchic alliance to the social movements of the 1970s and their demands for economic reform and political inclusion was repression not compromise. Very few of those who owned coffee estates, agro-export firms, or other elite enterprises and few urban professionals supported the insurgency; the few dozen urban intellectuals who led the FMLN were the rare exceptions.
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Support for the FMLN was much more likely on the part of poor Salvadorans than of middle and upper class people. The vast majority of insurgent combatants were from poor rural backgrounds (McClintock 1998: 266-7); they are the focus of this study.
But rural class position --neither in the narrow sense as defined by access (or not) to land or other assets, nor in a wider sense of relative income --does not adequately explain participation in the Salvadoran insurgency. Before the war, El Salvador's rural poor were highly heterogeneous in terms of their livelihoods. Class differences among the campesinos of the case-study areas do not explain differences in their participation. The evidence presented here from the case-study areas (Chapters 4-7) shows that participants in the insurgency came from a variety of poor rural class backgrounds. The many campesinos who joined government networks and civil patrols or served as government informants came from equally diverse economic backgrounds.
The "high risk activism" underlying the Salvadoran insurgency is puzzling not just because the likely costs were so great, but also because the apparent benefits were so limited. As Mancur Olson (1965) pointed out in his critique of Marx's approach, collective action of the type studied here yields benefits (when successful) which are public goods--their enjoyment does not depend on one's having contributed to their provision. In these cases, Olson famously concluded, forms of collective action that are costly to individuals will not be sustained except where participation is coerced or motivated voluntarily through the x provision of "selective incentives" available only to those participating. Extending Olson's approach, Samuel Popkin in The Rational Peasant (1979) argued that revolutionaries offer such individual incentives (for Popkin, exclusively material benefits) to peasants contingent on their participation, thereby possibly overcoming the free-rider problem.
This selective incentive argument does not appear to hold for the casestudy areas, however. Before the war, few material benefits were won; rather, the consequence of mobilization was violence not than material gains (Chapter 4). Early in the civil war, the insurgents offered very few benefits to civilian supporters. From about 1984 to the end of the war, it was possible for campesinos in contested areas to remain in the vicinity and farm abandoned land whether or not they participated in the insurgency (Chapter 5). During that period, the material benefits that the insurgents offered in the case-study areas --access to abandoned land and a degree of autonomy from the daily authority of landlords and the security forces --were available to everyone (non-participants as well as participants) who remained in these contested areas whenever they were available to participants, and thus did not have the requisite selective structure required to overcome the obstacles to collective action. In short, "free-riding" on the insurgency was possible --indeed, most peasants in the case-study areas (about two thirds of them) took advantage of this possibility and did not actively support the insurgents.
In contrast to Popkin, some scholars note that guerrillas often offer peasants collective, rather than selective, goods, much as a state might do (Skocpol 1982; Goodwin and Skocpol 1989; Wickham Crowley 1987 and 1991) . Doing so, they argue, is an essential element of the consolidation of revolutionary movements: guerrillas offer land and other subsistence goods in areas under their control as an incentive to joining or supporting insurgent forces. But how the provision of collective goods in itself motivates individual participation in insurgent collective action, thereby squaring the Olsonian circle, is not evident. The FMLN did indeed become an alternative governing authority to some extent in some of the case-study areas and did provide some collective goods. But campesinos in the contested areas could enjoy these few goods without directly supporting the FMLN.
Some scholars emphasize the provision of protection from government forces as a material benefit extended by revolutionary forces. Protection, or the xi hope of some degree of protection, motivates participation in insurgency particularly when government violence does not target insurgents but is indiscriminate: in that case, joining the insurgents would at least not increase the chance of government violence against the insurgent and his family (Mason and Krane 1989). In extreme form, state violence leaves "no other way out" than joining the insurgency (Goodwin 2001). Protection motivated some campesinos to flee advancing government forces with guerrilla units during the early years of the worst and most arbitrary government violence. While some subsequently joined the ranks of supporters, many others made their way back to their homes when the situation was calmer or sought refugee in urban areas without further supporting the insurgents. More importantly, during most of the war, the FMLN offered little protection from government forces in the case-study areas. Even in their strongholds of northern Morazán and Chalatenango, the FMLN could not protect residents from aerial bombardment and many civilians went to refugee camps until the late 1980s (Bourgois 1982 and 2001; Pearce 1986). Thus, protection per se does not explain the ongoing participation of those who continued to support the insurgency.
One extension of Olson's framework suggests that pre-existing social networks and a common collective identity might provide frequent and multifaceted contact based on shared norms. Some close-knit communities have a high capacity for collective action due to their cultural homogeneity and the "generalized reciprocity" among their members: in this context of repeated, ongoing interactions, participants could impose sufficiently high costs on prospective non-participants to ensure widespread participation (Taylor 1988). A classic example of social networks comprising strong communities comes from the U.S. South where the activism on the part of local civil rights protesters was supported by the strong social networks and significant resources of the African American churches and colleges (Morris 1984). Peasant communities with strong horizontal networks are necessary for revolutionary mobilization, according to Barrington Moore (1966). In contrast, James Scott (1976) emphasized the erosion of vertical relations: marginal community members rebel when reciprocal relations with landlords (the "moral economy") are threatened by the expansion of markets or increased demands for resources by the state.
But long before El Salvador's descent into civil war, its traditional peasant communities had been disrupted by migration and the concentration of land in the hands of the wealthy landlords. The displacement of Indian from indigenous xii communities occurred from the late nineteenth century through the first decades of the twentieth as coffee cultivation expanded rapidly as a result of increasing restriction on communal forms of property. Indigenous culture in El Salvador virtually disappeared after the brutal repression of indigenous rebellions, including the uprising of 1932 after which tens of thousands of indigenous people were killed. And traditional patron-client relationships (colonato) on estates were gradually replaced by highly-coercive wage-labor relationships as the cultivation of cotton and sugar and cattle-raising expanded in the aftermath of World War II. Local social ties were increasingly weakened as increasingly landpoor campesinos sought work in distant labor markets. Thus the breakup of the traditional peasant communities occurred too early to explain the mobilization beginning in the 1970s.
Moreover, there is little evidence that pre-existing social networks before the mobilization of the 1970s in El Salvador were sufficiently strong, or that the norms of rural communities, political culture, and identity were sufficiently robust to enforce participation in a context of such high risk. Based on a 1973 survey of campesinos, Jesuit sociologist Segundo Montes (1986: 144-5) characterized the rural poor as fatally resigned to poverty and misery, as venerating both civil and military authority, and with little potential for class consciousness. Religious practices such as the veneration of particular saints by lay societies generally reinforced this fatalism (Cabarrús 1983: 144). Compared to the communities Scott studied in South East Asia, there was little social solidarity and little evidence of a "moral economy" of close reciprocal ties immediately before the 1970s mobilization. Competition for land and jobs rather than solidarity characterized relations between peasants before the war.
That a widespread social movement and later an agrarian insurgency did emerge in El Salvador suggests, nonetheless, that a "hidden transcript" of discontent and resistance (Scott 1985) , in contrast to the public performance of deference and conformity, may have been available to be tapped, despite the absence of strong communities or social networks. Many landlords were willing to pay for the billeting of members of the National Guard on their estates, a more draconian solution to ordinary problems of social order than most societies provide, which suggests landlords did not discount the possibility of collective action on the part of their work force. To some extent, songs and legends kept alive the memory of the heroes of past rebellions (Boland 2000). In interviews, a few campesinos mentioned smuggling small amounts of coffee beans from the xiii coffee estates, but many more mentioned the severe punishment such "weapons of the weak" incurred.
Social networks of radicalized catechists and members of guerrilla groups did play a role in insurgent collective action, coordinating local protest into a national movement in the 1970s. But these networks were not based on strong antecedent communities but instead emerged in the mid 1970s as a result of the new pastoral practices on the part of some Catholic priests and organizations, on the one hand, and initial organizing efforts by the then-tiny guerrilla organizations, on the other (Chapter 4). The latter were initially outsiders; only as the government's repression intensified in the late 1970s did local residents join.
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That the values, beliefs, social norms, and political identities of these new networks could outweigh the risk of disappearance, torture, and death is of course at the heart of the puzzle of Salvadoran insurgency.
In another approach to political mobilization, a necessary condition for the emergence of social movements is the widening of political opportunity (McAdam 1982 , Kitschelt 1986 ). As political opportunity increases, as when elite alliances weaken or relevant legal provisions change, the potential benefits of collective action increase or the costs decrease, or both. More precisely, movement organizers may seize such changes in political opportunity to reframe perceptions on the part of potential participants to encourage their joining. The challenge for this perspective is to specify changes in political opportunity nontautologically; that is, the observation of political mobilization cannot itself count as evidence of the widening of political opportunity if the approach is to explain that mobilization (Goodwin and Jasper 1999).
There is no question that on some occasions, political mobilization in El Salvador responded to variation in political opportunity. Marches and demonstrations disappeared in the early 1980s at the height of repression. A vibrant rural civil society emerged during the military stalemate of the mid to late 1980s, spreading outward from guerrilla strongholds as activists observed the success of neighboring cooperative's in occupying land and acted on the perception of widened political opportunity to form their own cooperatives (Chapter 6).
But other aspects of the insurgency are puzzling from this standpoint. Political mobilization increased in El Salvador in the late 1970s despite the xiv narrowing of what would seem essential components of political opportunity: election results were increasingly controlled, efforts at land reform by a reformist president were defeated by hardline military officers, and repression by state security forces was rapidly intensifying. Severe repression did not quell political mobilization but resulted in significant numbers of erstwhile protestors becoming guerrilla members or supporters, thereby deepening the conflict. President Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights in U.S. foreign policy and the Sandinista revolution in nearby Nicaragua may have comprised a widening of political opportunity for international alliances in the late 1970s, but it is difficult to see how that would outweigh for ordinary people the immediate experience of rising state violence. Equally puzzling from the political opportunity perspective is the fact that the widening of political opportunity since the signing of the peace accord and the democratization of the political regime has been associated with a considerable reduction in political mobilization despite significant enduring grievances.
In short, classic accounts of revolutionary mobilization --class struggle, widening political opportunity, solidary peasant communities, pre-existing social networks, and selective benefits --do not adequately account for patterns of insurgent collective action in El Salvador. Even as extended with these classic accounts, Olson's canonical framework appears, at best, to account for the majority of Salvadorans who did not participate in the insurgency. It provides little illumination about those who did.
A satisfactory explanation of insurgent participation in the war will have to account for several patterns in the insurgent collective action I observed in the case-study areas of the municipality of Tenancingo, in the department of Cuscatlán, and several municipalities in Usulután (Chapters 4-6). First, on the basis of my interviews and observations of meetings of campesino organizations, I show that participation was voluntary (with a few exceptions). Second, participation was also widespread: my necessarily rough estimate is that about a third of campesinos who stayed in the case-study areas actively supported the guerrilla forces by providing intelligence, moving ordnance, and serving in parttime militias. Third, the form of insurgent collective action evolved over time, from Bible study groups based on the teaching of liberation theology in some areas of Usulután and from covert guerrilla cells in others, to strikes, marches, and demonstrations typical of labor and social movements, to covert support for the guerrilla organizations, to participation in opposition organizations overtly allied xv to the FMLN. Fourth, individuals participated in different ways, and many moved in and out of various forms and degrees of participation for a variety of personal and political reasons. While some campesinos participated throughout the insurgency and in a variety of forms of collective action, others joined only during the military stalemate of the mid and late 1980s. Fifth, the end of the civil war did not return political culture in Usulután and Tenancingo to the status quo ante. Its legacy included new values, norms, practices, beliefs, and memories that comprised new political identities and culture: once-quiescent campesinos had for over a decade contested the authoritarian practices of landlords and the state and asserted unprecedented claims to citizenship.
Given that two-thirds of residents of the case-study areas chose not to support the insurgency, what explains the insurgent collective action of the other third? Why did people so similarly situated in terms of their economic circumstances before the war act so differently? And why did people in quite different circumstances sometimes act so similarly? What accounts for these patterns of participation and non-participation?
I sought an answer in interviews with more than two hundred campesinos, participants as well as non-participants, which I carried out in militarily-contested areas of El Salvador between 1987 and 1996. My insurgent informants made it clear to me that moral commitments and emotional engagements were principal reasons for insurgent collective action by campesinos in the Salvadoran civil war. For insurgent campesinos, the act of rebellion constituted a defiance of longresented authorities, a repudiation of perceived injustices (particularly the brutal and arbitrary violence by security forces), a claim to rights to land and selfdetermination, and an assertion of new collective identities that fueled and reflected the civil war. Through rebelling, insurgent campesinos asserted --and thereby constituted --their dignity in the face of condescension, repression, and indifference.
The resolution of the collective action puzzle posed by the Salvadoran insurgency, I shall show, thus rests principally on moral and emotional reasons for participation; two were particularly important. One was the expression of moral outrage at state violence and defiance of state authority. Participation per se expressed outrage and defiance; unlike other possible reasons for participating, its force was not negated by the fact that victory was unlikely and in any case was not contingent on one's participation. The second was the pride taken by campesinos xvi in their successful assertion of their interests and identity, what I term here the pleasure of agency. To advance material interests through the occupation of properties, to refute condescending elite perceptions of one's incapacities, and thereby to undercut lingering fears of one's inferiority was a source of participants' collective pride, and indeed pleasure. In short, insurgent campesinos were motivated in part by valuing their making history.
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The reasons advanced here thus differ in two ways from those emphasized in conventional accounts of collective action. First, participant motivations were not limited to canonical self-regarding preferences such as material benefits defined over the consequences of one's actions. To be sure, the desire for land is part of the story: landlessness initially motivated some campesinos; recalcitrant opposition to land redistribution motivated state repression; access to abandoned land provided the autonomy that made possible insurgent collective action for many; and moral outrage at the injustice of landlessness and the brutal measures taken to ensure it fueled mobilization. But during the war, insurgent campesinos did not act because they believed they had a reasonable chance of getting land as a result of their own participation. Rather, reasons for which participants acted referred irreducibly to the well-being of others as well as oneself and to processes not just outcomes. Second, political culture --the values, norms, practices, beliefs, and collective identity of insurgents --were not given but evolved in response to the experiences of the conflict itself, namely, previous rebellious actions, repression, and the ongoing interpretation of events by the participants themselves. 12 I marshal various kinds of evidence to support my interpretation of insurgent collective action. The primary evidence for my interpretation are interviews with hundreds of participants in the insurgency, the vast majority campesinos but including mid-level FMLN commanders (most from campesino families), and with non-participants, including campesinos, military officers, and landlords. Nearly all of these interviews were lengthy; I interviewed some of the respondents on various occasions over several years. I also use maps drawn for me by insurgent campesinos in the Usulután case-study areas. In addition to various published and unpublished documents, I analyze data-bases of electoral results and of the evolution of agrarian property rights. Finally, I illustrate the central argument of the book with a formal model (Appendix I).
The argument presented here thus draws on literatures --on peasant xvii rebellion, revolution, social movements, and collective action --often treated in isolation (but see McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). The origin of a revolutionary peasant rebellion is traced to an antecedent social movement, and the resolution of the puzzle of collective action depends on emotional processes, moral perceptions, and shifting political culture as well as on the emergence of insurgent social networks and widening political opportunity. The account centers on the local political processes of insurgency, such as the path-dependent consequences of political violence and the assertion of agency by long subordinate people, and treats changes in political culture as not just consequences but causes of further insurgency.
Overview of the Civil War in El Salvador
The roots of the civil war in El Salvador lie in the country's longstanding patterns of economic, political, and social exclusion. As elsewhere in Central American the colonial period saw the gradual encroachment of haciendas and estates on indigenous lands and intensifying attempts to direct indigenous labor toward Spanish enterprises. Unlike other Latin American countries, the expansion of coffee production in the late nineteenth century occurred in areas where indigenous communities were highly concentrated (Roseberry 1991), a pattern that had dramatic consequences for the country's subsequent development. 13 The geography of coffee cultivation put commercial and government elites in competition with indigenous communities for land and indigenous labor. It also intensified conflicts within indigenous communities as some members saw opportunities for commercial production while others saw infringement of cultural prerogatives (Lauria-Santiago 1999). Legal and economic reforms introduced in the 1880s made it increasingly difficult for indigenous communities to retain communal landholdings. While some community members benefitted directly by varied processes of privatization, most beneficiaries were middle-class professionals, including some military officers, well-positioned to take advantage of their understanding of the complicated legal procedures to obtain private title and credit for cultivation.
While the process took several decades to complete, key features of the country's political economy at the outbreak of civil war in the late 1970s were already in place by the 1930s. The best agricultural land was increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small group of coffee plantation owners, and the xviii processing of coffee was also controlled by a small group (whose membership overlapped to some extent with the former but which also included significant numbers of recent immigrants). Together the two groups comprised a classic oligarchy that largely controlled coffee production, processing, export and finance. The high demand for labor on coffee plantations was met by the combination of a permanent, unfree labor force living on the estates under highly restrictive conditions (including restrictions on movement without the permission of the landlord and debt peonage) and the massive migration of poor people from across El Salvador to the estates during the months of the harvest.
Some indigenous groups resisted the expansion of private and state prerogatives, occasionally through armed uprisings (Kincaid 1987) . But the suppression of these revolts and the control of the labor force was ensured by the founding of the National Guard and other security forces to enforce private property rights; a close local relationship between landlords and government forces emerged and endured for decades. In 1932, approximately 17,000 indigenous people were killed by state forces in the aftermath of a failed uprising organized by the fledgling Communist Party, an event that seared elite memories and solidified elite opposition to political reform (Anderson 1971; Paige 1997). The massacre profoundly undermined indigenous culture as the threat of renewed state violence led to the abandonment of traditional dress, language, and many other indigenous practices.
La matanza (the massacre) and the subsequent years of General Maximiliano Hernández Martínez's regime forged an enduring alliance between the oligarchy and the military. Though riven by divergent interests on some issues, this oligarchic alliance agreed on the bottom line: the maintenance of the country's rigid class structure and its exclusionary political regime. Military officers ruled (with a brief exception in the 1940s), usually through a veneer of tightly controlled elections always won by the official party, while economic elites controlled key economic ministries. The majority of Salvadorans labored for little pay with little access to education or medical services, enduring extraordinary poverty and social exclusion, even by Latin American standards.
The development of cotton, sugar, and cattle production after World War II did little to diversify the economic elites who controlled the cultivation, export, and processing of the new crops as of the old. Economic power remained extremely concentrated as these families controlled the financial sector, the export xix agricultural sector, and the slowly expanding manufacturing sector (Colindres 1976 and 1977; Sevilla 1985; Paige 1987) . The oligarchic alliance continued to patrol the bottom line: rural labor unions remained illegal, National Guardsmen were billeted on the largest estates, and government economic policy did not encroach on elite prerogatives.
The result of this pattern of economic exclusion was a highly unequal distribution of land (Figure 1.4) . Farms of larger than 100 hectares constituted less than 1 percent of all farms (0.7 percent), but they constituted over a third of the land (38.7 percent). In contrast, half of the farms (48.9 percent) were smaller than a hectare but together comprised less than 5 percent of farmland. These figures substantially underestimate the inequality of access to land, moreover, for two reasons. First, this distribution, the only one available, counts farms, not families. As wealthy families tended to own more than one farm, the concentration of farmland by family was significantly higher than by farm. Second, landless families are not included in the distribution of farms. This is very significant as agricultural workers, temporary or permanent, comprised more than half of the economically active agrarian population (see Moreover, poverty and landlessness intensified in the decades preceding the civil war. As shown in Figure 1 .5, temporary day workers increased from 27.6 percent of the economically active agrarian population in 1961 to 38.1 percent in 1971. Permanent wage workers increased from 12.4 percent to 17.1 over the same period. The landed fraction of the economically active agrarian population meanwhile decreased from 28.5 percent to 14.4 percent. Two factors contributed to this rapid increase in landlessness: the return of more than 100,000 landpoor campesinos from Honduras after the 1969 "soccer war" led to their expulsion from that country (Durham 1979 ) and the modernization of some agrarian labor practices, particularly the increasing emphasis on wage labor. For poor rural residents, these changes were dire. According to the Economic Commission on Latin America (1984: 61-2), 76.4 percent of rural residents lived in poverty, without income sufficient to meet their basic needs, and 55.4 percent lived in extreme poverty, without the income to pay for a minimum shopping-basket of food.
Insert Figure 1 .5 about here One result of this unequal distribution of land, income, and opportunity and its maintenance by coercive labor practices was an acquiescent campesino political culture in which overt resistance was extremely muted. Segundo Montes (1986), Ignacio Martín-Baró (1973), and other scholars noted pervasive attitudes of self-deprecation, fatalism, conformism, and individualism among Salvadoran campesinos. Martín-Baró traced this culture to the poverty, dependency and insecurity of the landless, landpoor, and those permanent employees who lived in clientelistic relationship to patrons (1973: 482-9). Clients lived in complete dependence on the patrón as the cost of deviance was to lose everything: work, food, and home. Frequent unemployment and the absence of ties to the land left landless day laborers dependent on wages earned as a result of migration. In their access to their own small landholdings, the landpoor had a limited degree of autonomy and security, which they deeply valued. Given the immediate repression of attempts to organize workers in the countryside, campesinos had little reason to expect any change in life circumstances; fatalism and conformism reinforced each other. Schooling provided little opportunity for social mobility as few rural children attended school past the first grade or two, as indicated by the 63 percent illiteracy rate in 1971 (Montes 1986: 98).
On the eve of the civil war, the political culture of economic elites combined paternalistic condescension with virulent anti-communism (Paige 1997). Elites understood any unrest as subversion of order rather than bargaining over terms of work, an ideology readily exploited by the military in a long standing "protection racket" whereby military privileges and prerogatives were accepted by economic elites as necessary for the maintenance of order (Stanley 1996) . Nor were such attitudes limited to the coffee elite. Despite their involvement in a crop whose cultivation depended on wage labor and modern technology, namely, cotton, the attitudes of landlords along the Pacific coast toward workers were little different. For example, the wife of an Usulután landlord recalled her good works of the by-gone days with nostalgia:
We lived on the property, unlike so many others. The social xxi relations were intimate, we were appreciated. I helped with birth control projects, through the Demographic Association. The Cotton Producers Association lent us two cars to travel around to give talks. Children were dying from pure ignorance; women were dying in labor. It was hard work. I brought some women here for the operation --sterilization. There are other methods but the truth is that they were so ignorant that you had to sterilize them. It was a nice project. With my friends from the other haciendas, I traveled around. We had equipment, nurses; we took down names, physical data. (San Salvador, 1992) While reformist factions of the military occasionally attempted to reform land tenure and labor relations, the core alliance of landlords and military hardliners defeated such attempts in 1944 , 1960 , 1972 , and 1976 (Stanley 1996 ; Walter and Williams 1993). Economic modernization did not lead to political modernization, but beginning in the 1960s the military regime allowed a degree of political participation, including contested municipal elections in the 1960s. This controlled political liberalization came to a dramatic halt in 1972:. The government had allowed a Christian Democrat candidate to run for the presidential election for the first time, but when José Napoleón Duarte, the popular Christian Democrat mayor of San Salvador, won the military quickly overruled the results.
Together, enduring economic exclusion and the renewed political closure in the 1970s fueled political mobilization both in urban areas, where Christian Democrats had built networks among the small middle class and workers in manufacturing, as well as in the countryside where the party had some success in organizing. More important in the countryside were new pastoral practices on the part of some Roman Catholic priests and other pastoral agents (Chapter 4). As the teaching of liberation theology spread through the Latin American Catholic Church, many priests and nuns in El Salvador abandoned their well-off parishes in favor of pastoral work among the urban and particularly the rural poor. Some encouraged parish members to train as catechists in centers that emphasized discussion and reflection in small Christian communities on the meaning of poverty and injustice. Some catechists then built networks across parishes and planned regional marches and strikes.
By the mid 1970s, other, covert, political groups were active in San Salvador and very limited areas of the countryside. The Fuerzas Populares de Liberación (Popular liberation Forces, FPL), founded in 1970 after a split in the Communist Party over the potential for armed struggle, organized cadre in covert cells in San Salvador, Santa Ana, and north central El Salvador. A rival organization, the ERP, was founded a few years later by intellectuals and university students who emphasized the potential of insurrectionary forms of political struggle. By the late 1970s, five such guerrilla organizations were recruiting university and secondary students in urban areas and campesinos in rural areas.
Partly as a result of these new political and religious actors, political mobilization rapidly expanded in the mid-1970s. The response of the government was repression rather than compromise. In 1975, a march protesting the extravagance of the Miss Universe pageant was machine-gunned by security forces, leaving thirty marchers dead. When President Arturo Molina announced a limited but symbolically important measure of agrarian reform in 1976, a renewed coalition of military hardliners and economic elites brought it to a swift end. Military hardliners strengthened the control of the military and security forces over key infrastructure such as the telephone system. The regime also poured resources into paramilitary organizations in the countryside, drawing on veterans and reserve members of the military as well as patron-client networks of powerful agrarian elites. Major Roberto d'Aubuisson, later to be infamous as the director of death squads, played an important role, compiling intelligence files and building covert networks of hardliners within the military.
Confronted with a massive social movement and a growing (though still small) guerrilla organization, divisions within the military deepened, culminating in a coup by young officers in October, 1979. The reformists officers were quickly displaced by a group of senior officers, however. Far from ending repression, the new junta oversaw its dramatic deepening. In response to the largest demonstration in Salvadoran history on January 22, 1980, the regime killed twenty people and wounded about two hundred. Forced to leave the military as part of the compromises between the young and senior officers, d'Aubuisson nonetheless continued to coordinate death squad units working out of intelligence services in various military units, the National Police, and the Treasury Police. In 1980, the number of those killed in political violence soon exceeded 1,000 a month, decimating the leadership of many opposition organizations. Any xxiii possibility of a broad revolutionary alliance including centrist political forces were short-circuited in November 1980 when government forces kidnapped and executed six leaders of the Frente Democrático Revolucionario (Democratic Revolutionary Front), a center-left alliance of urban and rural groups led by urban professionals.
While repression discouraged some from participating, it galvanized others (Chapters 4 and 7). Many joined the guerrilla organizations after the March 1980 assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who was assassinated the day after he called for soldiers to refuse to obey orders. As was widely believed at the time, on the orders of Roberto d'Aubuisson, a death squad (which included two Armed Forces captains) planned Romero's assassination, according to the Truth Commission (1993: 354-7).
As the country descended toward civil war, four guerrilla organizations (later joined by the fifth) founded the FMLN in November 1980 to better coordinate their efforts. Their "final offensive" of January 1981 failed, however, and the guerrilla organizations withdrew to the countryside to reorganize their forces for a longer struggle.
While the junior officer coup did not end repression, it did smooth the way for a new governing alliance. When the initial junta members found they could neither curb the growing violence by para-military and government forces against popular organizations nor in fact decide state policy, several members resigned, prompting a search for a new governing coalition. As part of its conditions for extending military assistance to the beleaguered regime, the United States insisted that the Christian Democratic Party be brought into the government, and that significant economic and political reforms be carried out. Even hard-line leaders of the military recognized the usefulness of the international legitimacy to be gained by governing in a broader coalition (Stanley 1996: 180-3). In March 1980, military forces occupied more than three hundred of the largest estates, turning the properties over to hastily-formed cooperatives of workers as the first phase of the agrarian reform. A land-to-the-tiller phase of the reform followed, in which small tenants could claim small amounts of property from their landlords. The result, particularly of the latter, was widespread violence in the countryside as government forces targeted rural leaders and landlords tenants who claimed land. The inability of the second junta to control the violence led to a split in the Christian Democratic Party as several ministers and officials resigned and left the xxiv country, a split which deepened after the assassination of Archbishop Romero. The second phase of the reform, which would have led to significant additional distribution of farmland, was never implemented.
The response of economic elites to the new governing alliance and the agrarian and other reforms was three-fold. First, many exported massive amounts of capital to Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States. 15 The change in government strategy soon led to a change in insurgent strategy as well. The FMLN reorganized its forces into small more mobile and xxv autonomous groups. As the change acknowledged that a victory was not imminent, it demoralized many insurgents, leading to a period of desertion and in some areas internal purges of suspected government collaborators (Gibb 2000). The FMLN's new strategy soon proved effective, however, and the insurgents slowly extended their covert presence in both rural and urban areas, carrying out brief sorties against military forces and intensifying economic sabotage. In some areas, campesinos began founding cooperatives and taking over abandoned land. By the mid-1980s, some analysts described the military situation as a stalemate. Others, misjudging the new FMLN strategy as declining military capability, foresaw a slow winding down of the war.
Another consequence of the shift in regime strategy away from violence against civilians was a shift within the ARENA party away from the leadership of d'Aubuisson toward new, more moderate leaders in order to appeal to a wider constituency. The shift within the party also reflected the shift in elite economic interests as export agriculture continued to decline and as remittances fueled a boom in services and commerce; economic elites with more diversified economic interests tended to be more moderate politically than those with interests narrowly in agro-export production (Paige 1997; Wood 2000). This shift in electoral strategy soon bore fruit: ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani defeated the Christian Democrat candidate in the 1989 presidential elections, as voters registered dissatisfaction with rumored government corruption and Duarte's failure to end the war. Desultory efforts at negotiation between the rebels and the Cristiani government soon broke done.
In November 1989, the FMLN launched an unprecedented offensive in San Salvador and several other major cities. Guerrilla forces succeeded in occupying some working-class neighborhoods of San Salvador for several days despite the absence of a general insurrection by the population. The panicked High Command ordered the Atlacatl Battalion to assassinate six Jesuit intellectuals, their housekeeper and her daughter, a measure that would bring an end to the effectively unconditional U.S. Congressional support for aid to the Salvadoran government (Whitfield 1994). Taking advantage of a serious tactical error on the part of the FMLN, the Air Force bombed urban neighborhoods where insurgents had holed up assuming they would be relatively sheltered from such tactics. FMLN forces regrouped and occupied the wealthy suburb of Escalón, for the first time bringing the war into the homes of the privileged. The offensive soon fizzled and the FMLN withdrew.
xxvi
The offensive brought to both the U.S. and Salvadoran governments the unwelcome realization that change in the Soviet Union and the declining popularity of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua had not eroded FMLN military capability. A structural basis of compromise as well as the enduring military stalemate undergirded the successful resolution of the Salvadoran civil war, in sharp contrast to other civil wars where negotiated compromises failed despite significant international assistance (Wood 2000). The country's political economy had shifted dramatically over the course of the war, away from its historical reliance on export agricultural production and processing toward a fast-growing commercial sector fueled by remittances sent from Salvadorans in the United States. No longer relying for their income on disciplining of agrarian labor by the security forces, economic elites in control of the ARENA party could afford compromises unthinkable a decade earlier, principally the inclusion of the left in the political party system and the transfer of policing from the military to a new civilian force.
Of course, the end of the Cold War also contributed to the negotiated resolution of the war, strengthening those more inclined to compromise within both the FMLN and the government. Importantly, the change in U.S. policy away from its long-standing support for the regime brought the Salvadoran military to the bargaining table. Indeed, a potential coup attempt by a hardline general was defused when the U.S., Mexico, and Venezuela all assured the conspirators that no petroleum would be forthcoming in the aftermath of a coup.
Serious negotiations to end the war began under U.N. mediation in 1990, culminating in the signing of the final peace agreement on January 16, 1992 in Mexico. Key government concessions included limiting the mandate of the military to defense, the disbanding of the security forces, the founding of a new civilian police force which would include ex-combatants of the FMLN, and the strengthening of judicial and electoral systems. The FMLN agreed to disarm, to enter the now-inclusive election system as a legally constituted political party, and to accept the terms of the 1983 constitution, including provisions protecting private property rights. In addition, the parties agreed that land would be transferred to ex-combatants of both sides as well as to FMLN supporters occupying land not their own. (Rumors of this provision fueled a last ditch land grab at the close of the war, but do not explain land takeovers that occurred earlier.) Detailed annexes to the agreements defined a chronology of steps to be taken by both sides over the course of the cease-fire; their staggered sequence would assure each party that the other was complying with the agreement. In addition, both parties agreed that a United Nations mission would monitor human xxvii rights violations during the cease-fire.
The subsequent cease-fire proceeded relatively smoothly: while some delays occurred, no shots were exchanged as the two forces separated to distinct geographical areas under U.N. monitoring for the nine months of the case-fire. Ongoing mediation by the U.N. mission contribution to the successful resolution of a series of crises, including ongoing land occupations, the reluctance of the military to demobilize the security forces, government suspicion that the FMLN had failed to turn over significant numbers of arms (subsequently proven correct when an arms cache in Managua, Nicaragua, exploded in 1993), and ongoing difficulties in implementing reforms to the electoral system in time for the first postwar elections.
In April, 1994, the first inclusive elections were held. The ARENA candidate won the presidency, after a runoff election between the candidate of a coalition of leftist parties including the FMLN. The FMLN won a respectable 21 out of 84 seats in the legislature. However, the FMLN split soon afterward as the leadership of the ERP formed a short-lived alliance in the legislature with ARENA. The ERP's electoral position fell dramatically in subsequent elections as its erstwhile militants voted for other parties, particularly for the FMLN, or declined to vote at all. The FMLN, in contrast, did increasingly well in the elections of 1997 and 2000, winning an increasing share of legislative seats and a rising number of municipal elections.
Thus insurgency forged democratic compromise in El Salvador by laying the political and economic bases of compromise. Tens of thousands of poor rural residents were willing to support the insurgents despite the waves of political violence that thundered around them. Insurgent campesinos embraced a new insurgent political identity and culture that made stringent demands on them, not because they naively believed illusory promises of future benefits contingent on their participation, but because they made moral commitments and emotional engagements to a vision of a more just future. xxviii 1 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from interviews carried out in Spanish by the author. 2 In referring to the poor rural residents of El Salvador as "campesinos" (literally, of the countryside, campo), I follow their own usage. The word is not well translated by "peasants" as many, indeed most, of those who refer to themselves as "campesinos" are not owners of smallholdings but merely aspire to be. Throughout this book, campesino refers to a person who engages in agricultural activities (except of course owners of properties who hire significant numbers of wage laborers) or, as an adjective, to refer to organizations in which campesinos participate. Thus a campesino may be a landless day-laborer, a permanent wage employee, or a farmer working a smallholding. When distinctions between these different types of agriculturalists are necessary for the argument, I make them explicitly.
3 Seligson and McElhinny 1996: Table 3 . Seligson and McElhinny compared more than twenty sources of statistics on war-related deaths in El Salvador, including those of the Salvadoran military, the U.S. Embassy, and various human rights organizations. They argue that the best estimate of total civilian and military related deaths in the Salvadoran civil war is between 80,000 and 94,000, of which 50,000 to 60,000 were civilians (ibid: 224). So the standard estimate of 75,000 deaths is a conservative one. The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, the standard cross-national source for statistics on political violence, seriously underestimates the level of violence in Central America (see Brockett 1992 for a critique). 4 Calculated from Loveman 1998: Table A1 . 5 Based on a post-war national survey of 1,400 people, Seligson and McElhinny (1996: 238) found that respondents who supported the FMLN were almost twice as likely to report the death of at least one family member during the war than respondents affiliated with the center and right (55.2 percent compared to 29.9 percent).
